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The antitrust laws of the United States were created to regulate a
domestic market in which foreign goods played a comparatively minor
role and in which the geographic parameters of competitive decision-
making were largely defined by national boundaries. Today U.S. markets
for goods and services are often filled with goods produced abroad, and
participants in these markets are likely to be competing on a scale that
includes numerous nations and even several continents.'
This internationalization of markets and of the process of competi-
tion challenges fundamental assumptions on which antitrust laws and an-
titrust thinking have been based, and it thus demands a critical
reassessment of antitrust law. This Symposium is intended to contribute
to that reassessment.
2
My objectives in this Foreword are to sketch points of impact of the
internationalization of competition on the antitrust laws, to suggest
themes for the reassessment that is called for, and to locate this Sympo-
sium in the context of that reassessment process.
II. THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF MARKETS
AND OF COMPETITION
The process of internationalizing markets has many facets and thus
many potential points of impact on the antitrust laws. Four aspects of
the process are, however, central: the increasing satisfaction of domestic
consumer wants by foreign goods; the increasing internationalization of
competitive decisions to satisfy those wants; the changing characteristics
of the economic enterprises engaged in this process; and the increasing
* Professor of Law, IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. B.A. 1967, Trinity College; M.A.
1969, Yale University; J.D. 1972, University of Chicago. The author would like to thank Andre
Fiebig for valuable research assistance.
1. See, e.g., I. MAGAZINER & R. REICH, MINDING AMERICA'S BUSINESS: THE DECLINE
AND RISE OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 29-30 (1982).
2. The internationalization of competition has similar effects on the competition laws of other
developed countries, but due to space limitations this Foreword focuses only on the situation in the
United States.
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potential relevance of governmental decisions to private economic
competition.
A. Foreign Goods/Domestic Wants
From the perspective of the consumer, the process of international-
ization is represented primarily by increases in the variety and quantity
of foreign-produced goods in United States markets.3 This means that
the wants of U.S. consumers increasingly are being satisfied through de-
cisions involving foreign production. Sometimes these are sourcing deci-
sions by domestic firms-e.g., the decision by a U.S. automotive
manufacturer to produce components in Brazil.4 They may also be deci-
sions by foreign firms either to produce for the U.S. market or purchase
for resale in that market. In each of these cases significant foreign ele-
ments are involved in the process of satisfying domestic wants.
B. Competition on an International Scale
Another component of the internationalization process is the in-
creasingly international framework for economic decisionmaking and
hence economic competition. The decisions that lead to the presence of
foreign goods in U.S. markets, for example, are influenced increasingly
by economic, political and legal factors in numerous countries, and the
competitors of domestic firms increasingly are foreign-based and/or for-
eign-owned.
This means that firms seek to satisfy wants with decreasing regard
for national political boundaries. They increasingly tend to make strate-
gic decisions concerning the sales of products and services by reference to
markets that include the territory of more than one state. 5
Such strategies also are influenced increasingly by the actions and
anticipated actions of rivals from foreign countries. Competitive deci-
sions involving the U.S. market must respond, for example, to rivals that
are structured differently from U.S. firms and subject to different cul-
tural, political and economic influences. This requires, in turn, that the
effectiveness of these decisions be based on increased information about
such factors. Because competitive decisions involve prediction about the
3. For statistics concerning imports from 1978 to 1987, categorized by country, see Eco-
NOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 367 (1988).
4. See Chrysler Move in Brazil, N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1986, at D2, col. 3.
5. For discussion, see, e.g., Pagoulatos & Sorensen, Industrial Policy and Firm Behavior in an
International Context, in WESTERN EcONOMIES IN TRANSITION 305 (J. Leveson & J. Wheeler eds.
1980); Porter, Changing Patterns of International Competition, 28 CAL. MGMT. REV. 9 (1986);
Thurow, Revitalizing American Industry: Managing in a Competitive World Economy, 27 CAL.
MGMT. REV. 9 (1984).
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probable conduct of rivals, such prediction now must encompass a
broader base of information.
6
Finally, a firm is normally not in a position to engage in interna-
tional competition unless it has the capacity to implement its competitive
decisions with little regard for national boundaries. This typically means
that it must be able to carry out its operations in many countries, includ-
ing producing its goods or services, securing financing, marketing and
distributing its goods or services, and acquiring necessary information
about purchasers and rivals.
C. Potential for Government Involvement
The internationalization of markets and of competition tends to in-
crease the number and variety of governmental decisions that may influ-
ence a firm's competitive decisions. Each state has the authority under
international law to control the flow of goods, persons and capital across
its borders, and as these flows increase so does the potential importance
of government decisionmaking to the competitive process.
Not only do the unilateral actions of states increase in importance,
but their international cooperative actions also acquire increased rele-
vance for the competitive process. Treaties and agreements among states
concerning tariffs, intellectual property rights, emigration, taxes and in-
formation exchange-to name a few-become critical factors in deter-
mining competitive strategies.
D. Characteristics of Internationally Competitive Firms
From the standpoint of antitrust policy, a particularly important as-
pect of the internationalization of competition is its impact on the char-
acteristics of firms affected by and/or participating in that process.
7
Certain characteristics are generally thought to allow firms to compete
more effectively in an international context. As a result, firms seek to
acquire such characteristics. Moreover, this often leads states to pursue
policies designed to provide their national firms with such characteristics
or at least encourage their development. Foremost among the character-
istics thought to be necessary for international competition is large size. 8
It is widely assumed that-at least in many industries-firms can com-
6. See generally Borner, Stuckey, Wehrle & Burgener, Global Structural Change and Interna-
tional Competition Among Industrial Firms: The Case of Switzerland, 38 KYKLOs 77, 81-82 (1985).
7. See, e.g., Ordover, Transnational Antitrust and Economics, in ANTITRUST AND TRADE
POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 233, 234-35 (B. Hawk ed. 1985).
8. See, e.g., Adams & Brock, The "New Learning" and the Euthanasia of Antitrust, 74 CALIF.
L. REV. 1516, 1519 (1986).
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pete effectively on an international scale only when they are very large,
and this assumption easily leads to competition among firms, as well as
states, to create ever larger firms.
The importance of size is often associated with the geographical dis-
persion of operations and assets. In particular, control of production fa-
cilities in numerous countries is thought to be necessary for effective
international competition. Firms must have the ability rapidly to shift
production from country to country in order to respond to changing con-
ditions in the markets in which they operate. Moreover, the strategical
and tactical exigencies of international competition are thought to re-
quire firms to maintain information and supply lines in many countries.
III. THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF COMPETITION AND THE
GOALS OF ANTITRUST
The internationalization of competition raises fundamental ques-
tions about antitrust law-its methods, values, assumptions, institutions
and even its reason for being. In this regard two questions are central:
(1) What is the impact of the internationalization process on the goals
and objectives of the antitrust laws? and (2) What is its impact on the
capacity of the antitrust laws to achieve those objectives?
A. The Impact of Internationalization
The impact of the internationalization of competition on the goals of
antitrust law must be assessed first, because only when there is reason-
able clarity concerning objectives is it meaningful to discuss the issue of
how antitrust can be used to attain them. Unfortunately, however, there
has been much confusion regarding goals in antitrust law, 9 and this con-
fusion has obscured the potential impact of the internationalization pro-
cess on this issue.
1. The Stability of Goals
At one level of analysis, it would seem axiomatic that the goals of
antitrust statutes do not change merely because there is a change in the
factual circumstances to which those laws are to be applied. The anti-
trust laws were intended to achieve certain domestic goals, and, consis-
tent with our constitutional scheme, a judge presumably must apply
those statutes in a manner consistent with her understanding of those





2. International Competitiveness and the Antitrust Laws
By altering the context in which the antitrust laws operate, however,
the internationalization of markets calls attention to a policy objective
that heretofore has not been considered a goal of antitrust law-namely,
the protection and enhancement of the international competitiveness of
domestic enterprises. Some argue, for example, that since the internation-
alization of markets requires larger and more cooperative domestic firms
in order to meet foreign competition, the antitrust laws should permit or
even encourage firms to acquire the characteristics thought to be neces-
sary for success in this competitive environment.II The internationaliza-
tion process suggests that established antitrust goals be weighed against
the need to protect and enhance the international competitiveness of do-
mestic firms.
This raises the issue of how, if at all, international competitiveness is
to be taken into account in applying the antitrust laws. Assuming no
change in the antitrust statutes, a judge could not legitimately base her
decision on a goal such as international competitiveness that is unrelated
and arguably antithetical to the established goals of the antitrust laws.
3. Uncertainty About Antitrust Goals
The problem is exacerbated by the perceived vagueness of the goals
of United States antitrust law, which are often thought to provide little
guidance for decision making. This perception has been particularly
acute during the last decade and a half, because a fundamental contro-
versy has developed between two opposing views of antitrust goals.1 2
One group considers antitrust goals to be pluralistic, based on legislative
intent and judicial interpretation of antitrust statutes. 13 In this view anti-
10. For discussion, see R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH IT-
SELF 82-84 (1978).
11. See, e.g., Adams & Brock, supra note 8, at 1518-19. Due in part to the internationalization
of markets, the United States enforcement agencies have liberalized enforcement policy toward do-
mestic mergers. See generally Areeda, Monopolization, Mergers, and Markets. A Century Past and
the Future, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 959, 978 (1987); Pollock, Vertical Restraints and the Secularization of
Antitrust, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 951, 953 (1987).
12. For discussion, see, e.g., Fox, The Battle for the Soul of Antitrust, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 917
(1987); Fox & Sullivan, Antitrust-Retrospective and Prospective. Where Are We Coming From?
Where Are We Going?, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 936 (1987); Pitofsky, Antitrust in the Next 100 Years,
75 CALIF. L. REV. 817 (1987); Turner, The Durability, Relevance, and Future ofAmerican Antitrust
Policy, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 797 (1987).
13. See generally Elzinga, The Goals of Antitrust: Other than Competition and Efficiency, What
Else Counts?, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1191 (1977); Katzman, The Attenuation ofAntitrust, 2 BROOKINGS
REV., Summer 1984, at 23, 23-24; Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of
1988]
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trust goals include, for example, limits on the concentration of economic
power, maintenance of economic opportunities for smaller competitors,
and the promotion of consumer welfare. A second group argues, how-
ever, that economic efficiency, as defined by neo-classical economic the-
ory, is the only legitimate goal of antitrust law.14
This uncertainty concerning the goals of antitrust obscures the im-
pact of international competitiveness concerns. The obvious popular ap-
peal of arguments based on the need for international competitiveness
has increased receptiveness to antitrust theories and enforcement pos-
tures that reduce the impact of antitrust law. The result often has been a
general weakening of antitrust law rather than its careful modification in
response to the impact of internationalization.
B. Reevaluating the Goals of Antitrust Law
The impact of the internationalization of competition on antitrust
goals requires that we ask whether those goals should be altered-in
form or in substance-and, if so, how and by whom?
1. Clarifying the Objectives of Antitrust Law
At a minimum, the internationalization process calls for clarification
of the goals to be served by antitrust law. That process fundamentally
changes the context in which the antitrust laws must operate. Combined
with the existing controversy over antitrust goals, it undermines confi-
dence that antitrust laws are reasonable means to well-considered ends.
Since no system of legal norms can function effectively without reason-
ably clear objectives, these changes in the context in which the system
operates require that those objectives be made explicit.
2. Issues in the Reevaluation of Antitrust Goals
This reevaluation of objectives must be as fundamental as the phe-
nomenon to which it is a response. It can only be credible if it avoids the
most common and egregious mistake in legal analysis-i. e., starting with
the solution (current law) rather than the problem. It must begin, there-
fore, with the question "What kind of economic system do we want, and
how can we achieve it?"
Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 67 (1982); Pitofsky, The Polit-
ical Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051 (1979); Schwartz, "Justice" and Other Non-
Economic Goals of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1076 (1979).
14. See, e.g., R. BORK, supra note 10, at 81-89; Bork, The Goals of Antitrust Policy, 57 AM.




In reevaluating antitrust goals, therefore, we must begin by asking
whether the United States should concern itself at all with the regulation
of structures of economic relationships within its borders. If it does not,
those relationships will be dictated increasingly by the process of interna-
tionalization. The incentive structures created by internationalization
and perceptions relating to it will mold United States economic relation-
ships. The characteristics thought to be necessary for domestic firms to
compete internationally-such as large size and international distribu-
tion of assets and operating capacity-will be fostered, while concerns
about the domestic economic, social and political implications of such
characteristics will not be legally relevant.
Whether such an outcome is desirable will depend, in part, on the
resolution of other fundamental issues relating to antitrust goals. The
current controversy concerning antitrust goals must, therefore, be placed
in an international context, with both sides required to defend their posi-
tions in light of the impact of the internationalization of competition.
Heretofore the arguments of both sides have been based primarily on a
domestic reference framework.
Arguments that economic efficiency should be the sole or at least
predominant antitrust goal are grounded in an economic model that re-
fers to the domestic economy. The notion is that the free play of market
forces normally will both direct resources to their best use and maximize
consumer welfare. The argument for a larger pie, regardless of the distri-
bution of benefits, generally assumes that the pie represents national
wealth. If, however, this argument is placed in an international context,
new issues arise. If economic efficiency goals would contribute to a
larger transnational pie, but distribute the benefits primarily to other na-
tions, serious political issues arise. If, for example, an efficiency-domi-
nated antitrust regime would contribute to a domestic market dominated
by foreign firms, the argument takes on a different hue.
Those who argue for a pluralistic view of antitrust goals will be
faced with similar challenges. For example, the internationalization of
competition may further increase the complexity of the cause and effect
relationships to which antitrust norms refer, thereby reducing confidence
that the application of those norms will yield the desired results. More-
over, it is likely to cast doubt on the efficacy and dependability of a sys-
tem based on judicial sorting among pluralistic goals, at least where such





Decisions concerning antitrust goals are closely related to decisions
concerning the methods by which such goals are to be chosen. Those
who argue for pluralistic antitrust goals seek guidance through the con-
ventional procedures of the U.S. legal tradition, finding insight as well as
authority in prior judicial opinions.' 5 Those who believe that antitrust is
largely coterminous with economic theory, however, typically take the
position that much of existing case law was simply based on ignorance
and, therefore, that prior cases provide no authority and even less
insight. 16
Neither group seems to take seriously the possibility that legislative
prescription might play an important role in efforts to clarify antitrust
goals. The legislative process may, however, represent potentially the
most effective means of establishing such goals. It alone provides oppor-
tunity for the type of comprehensive review that the magnitude of the
internationalization process requires. Perhaps most importantly, legisla-
tive consideration of goals should generate open and responsible discus-
sion of the policy alternatives.' 7 The potential harms from disregarding
legislative processes are illustrated by concern over the international
competitiveness of United States firms. Such concerns should be dealt
with openly, but because there is no reasonable likelihood of legislative
action to deal with them, they operate as a vague, unspoken threat that
influences the behavior of judges and enforcement officials in ways that
are not subject to debate and analysis.
IV. ACHIEVING ANTITRUST LAW OBJECTIVES
Assuming reasonable clarity concerning the central goals which an-
titrust law might serve, the question becomes "How, if at all, can anti-
trust laws be used to attain these goals?"
A. The Evaporation Effect: Reducing the Need for the Antitrust Laws
One possibility is that the internationalization process reduces or
15. See, e.g., L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 10-13 (1977).
16. "The judges made this law, and they made some of it badly. There is no particular reason
why they should not begin to remake the law that is defective so that it serves an understandable
social purpose." Judicial Precedent and the New Economics, in ANTITRUST POLICY IN TRANSITION:
THE CONVERGENCE OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 8 (E. Fox & J. Halverson eds. 1984) (comments of
Judge Bork).
17. For related arguments, see Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L.




even eliminates the need for antitrust law.'" The argument is that the
internationalization of competition generates competitive influences on
conduct that have an effect roughly equivalent to the effect sought to be
achieved by the antitrust laws.19 International competition creates com-
petitive pressures on firms operating in the United States market and
thus reduces the incentives for firms operating there to engage in an-
ticompetitive conduct. In particular, international competition is
thought to prevent the development of market power, thus eliminating
the possibility of antitrust violations that presuppose the presence of such
power. In this view, therefore, the need for antitrust evaporates with
increased internationalization.
While international competition does tend to increase competitive
pressure within domestic markets and, as a result, reduce incentives for
at least certain types of anticompetitive conduct, caution is required in
drawing conclusions from this general tendency. To say that increased
international competition tends to reduce the need for antitrust law in
some circumstances does not justify the assumption that this effect would
occur with respect to any particular norms under any particular circum-
stances. What is needed, therefore, is careful analysis of the impact of
internationalization on specific functions and goals of antitrust.
In addition, this evaporation argument is easily confused with argu-
ments that the importance of international competitiveness requires a re-
duced role for antitrust law, because both arguments suggest a
diminished role for antitrust on the basis of very general tendencies. The
two arguments are, however, fundamentally different. The international
competitiveness argument relates to the goals and values that are used in
determining state policy; the evaporation effect argument suggests a
change not in the desired social objectives, but in the need to use law to
achieve that end.
18. See generally L. THUROW, THE ZERO-SUM SOCIETY 146 (1980); Axinn, Greene, & Denis,
Importing Foreign Competition into American Antitrust Analysis-Is This the New "'New Learning"?,
in ANTITRUST AND TRADE POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 191, 218-20 (B. Hawk ed. 1985);
Fikentscher, Third World Trade Partnership: Supranational Authority vs. National Extraterritorial
Antitrust-A Plea for "Harmonized" Regionalism, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1489, 1498 (1984) (arguing
that internationalization of the world economic system reduces the utility of national antitrust
policies).
19. For background, see Grossman, Import Competition from Developed and Developing Coun-
tries, 64 REV. ECON. & STATISTICS 271 (1982) (discusses the competition domestic producers face
regarding imports from developing and developed countries). See also Axinn, Greene, & Denis,
supra note 18, at 203-05.
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B. Internationalization and the Capacity of Antitrust Law
to Achieve Its Goals
Assuming that antitrust law is necessary to achieve the desired so-
cial objectives, the next question is whether the internationalization pro-
cess affects the capacity of antitrust law to achieve its objectives.
1. The Effectiveness of Antitrust Concepts
The internationalization of competition may alter the effectiveness
of concepts used in antitrust law. Concepts that may be effective in
achieving particular objectives in a domestic context may be rendered
less effective in achieving such goals in the context of international com-
petition. Antitrust concepts-like most legal concepts-assume particu-
lar causal relationships between conduct and its effects. International
competition may, however, alter these causal relationships, with the re-
sult that it also alters the outcomes generated by applying the legal con-
cepts based on them.
The issues of market power and market definition provide exam-
ples. Many antitrust provisions--e.g., those relating to monopolization
and merger control-require the measurement of economic power, 20
and, under current law, such power must be assessed in relation to spe-
cific geographic and product markets. These markets, in turn, must be
defined. While the definition of markets and the measurement of market
power are not precise even in purely domestic cases, 2' the international-
ization of competition increases difficulties associated with their use and
thus tends to impair the effectiveness of the conceptual structure based
on them. 2
2
One aspect of this phenomenon relates to the issue of supply poten-
tial that is a central analytical element in market definition and market
power analysis. Where competition takes place exclusively or predomi-
nantly among firms whose operations are confined to a delimited geo-
graphic sphere such as that created by national boundaries, the issue of
supply potential tends to be relatively unproblematic because competing
firms cannot quickly and easily alter the supply of product they bring to
market. In order to do this they would have to invest in new production
20. See, e.g., Harris & Jorde, Antitrust Market Definition: An Integrated Approach, 72 CALIF. L.
REV. 3 (1984); White, Antitrust and Merger Policy: A Review and Critique, 1 J. ECON. PERSP., Fall
1987, at 13, 14-16.
21. See generally Areeda, Market Definition and Horizontal Restraints, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 553
(1983); Harris & Jorde, supra note 20.
22. See Baker, Market Definition and International Competition, 15 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL.
377 (1983); Leitzinger & Tamor, Foreign Competition in Antitrust Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 87 (1983).
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facilities or retool existing facilities. Where competing firms produce and
distribute on a transnational scale, however, they may be able to alter
their supply of product to purchasers in a particular geographic area
merely by shifting the flow of existing production. The ease with which
product flows can be manipulated thus increases the difficulty of defining
markets, assessing the power of firms within those markets, and adjudg-
ing the influence of potential foreign competition on domestic competi-
tive relationships. Here a concept that functions at least tolerably well
where the level of internationalization is low is likely to function less well
in an international context.
2. Jurisdiction and Enforcement
The internationalization of competition may also reduce antitrust
law's capacity to achieve its goals by impairing antitrust enforcement.
23
A large multinational firm generally has a greater capacity to shift com-
ponents of its operations quickly, conveniently and efficiently from one
country to another, thus reducing the ability of any one state to regulate
those activities, at least unilaterally.
a. Lack of Prescriptive and Judicial Jurisdiction
The increased capacity of firms to manipulate the location of their
activities means that some conduct relating to competition in the U.S.
market may not be subject to U.S. law because of jurisdictional re-
straints. Domestic jurisdictional concepts provide, in general, that U.S.
laws extend to conduct outside U.S. territory by non-U.S. firms only
where the conduct has particular types of effects (e.g., foreseeable effects)
within the United States.24  Moreover, jurisdictional entitlements of
states are restricted under international law, which normally allows a
state to prescribe norms of conduct only where (1) the conduct occurs
within the territory of the state, (2) the object of jurisdiction is a national
of that state, or (3) there are particular effects of the conduct within the
territory of that state.25 Since U.S. jurisdictional concepts exhaust enti-
tlements under international law, the United States could not signifi-
23. Some scholars have called for a comprehensive reassessment of United States antitrust en-
forcement. See, e.g., Hawk, International Antitrust Policy and the 1982 Acts: The Continuing Need
for Reassessment, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 201, 206 (1982).
24. See Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, §§ 401-403,
96 Stat. 1246, (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6a, 45(a)(3) (1982)).
25. See 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 402 (1987); Castel, The Extraterritorial Effects of Antitrust Laws, 179 RECUEIL DES COURS 13, 26-
35 (1983); Gerber, Beyond Balancing: International Law Restraints on the Reach of National Laws,
10 YALE J. INT'L L. 185, 190 (1984).
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cantly expand the jurisdictional reach of its laws without violating
international law.
Even where conduct is subject to U.S. laws, United States courts
may not be permitted to exercise jurisdiction with respect to a firm com-
mitting an offense because that firm may not have the contacts with the
United States that are requisite to personal jurisdiction under U.S. law.
Constitutional requirements of due process have been interpreted, for ex-
ample, to require courts to consider in assessing jurisdiction the relative
burdens on the parties as well as the regulatory justifications for impos-
ing such burdens.
26
Finally, in order to avoid conflicts with other states, U.S. courts
have developed several principles that may prevent a court from exercis-
ing jurisdiction to which it might otherwise be entitled. For example,
principles of comity require U.S. courts to consider the interests of other
states as well as the foreign relations interests of the United States in
applying U.S. law-courts may not exercise jurisdiction where the prob-
able harm to such interests cannot be justified by the regulatory interests
of the United States.
27
b. Impediments to Effective Application of United States Law
Assuming that a U.S. court has requisite personal and subject mat-
ter jurisdiction, the foreign location of the conduct and/or information
relating to it may prevent effective application of U.S. law. The court
and the parties may both lack access, for example, to relevant evidence or
other information.28 This is particularly likely where the foreign state in
which the information is located has enacted so-called "blocking stat-
utes" to prohibit nationals and residents of such state from providing
information to, or otherwise cooperating with, foreign proceedings. 29
This lack of access to information may prevent a court from obtaining
evidence necessary for the application of U.S. law.
c. Limits on the Enforceability of U.S. Judgments
Finally, even if judgment is obtained in the U.S. against a foreign
firm, the foreign location of defendant's assets may reduce the impact of
that judgment. A foreign state may refuse to enforce the U.S. judgment,
26. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113-16 (1987).
27. See. e.g., Gerber, supra note 25, at 203-06.
28. For discussion of such access issues, see Gerber, Extraterritorial Discovery and the Conflict
of Procedural Systems: Germany and the United States, 34 AM. J. COMP. L. 745 (1986).
29. See, e.g., Cira, The Challenge of Foreign Laws to Block American Antitrust Actions, 18
STAN. J. INT'L L. 247 (1982).
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increasing the uncertainty and the potential cost of litigation and thua
reducing the deterrent effect of the U.S. regulatory provisions.30 U.S.
reliance on private litigation for enforcement of the antitrust laws ampli-
fies the significance of limits on the enforceability of United States law
because private litigants are presumably more likely to be deterred from
litigation by the reduced probability of enforcement than are public
authorities.
d. Additional Consequences
These limitations on the ability of the U.S. to enforce the antitrust
laws against foreign firms have additional consequences. They create the
perception, for example, that competition in the U.S. market may be un-
fair because such laws impose greater costs on U.S. firms than on foreign
firms. This, in turn, leads to the conclusion that since the antitrust laws
cannot be applied evenly to all competitors, their scope should be re-
duced. The greater the severity of the antitrust laws, so the argument
goes, the greater the advantage to foreign firms who may not be subject
to the full effects of those laws. Moreover, the apparent ineffectiveness of
antitrust laws in reaching some conduct of some competitors fuels the
argument that those laws are ineffective and, therefore, cannot be
justified.
C. Reevaluating the Means Used to Attain Antitrust Goals
The internationalization of competition thus has far-reaching impli-
cations for the effectiveness of antitrust laws in achieving antitrust goals.
Consequently, it calls for rethinking the substance, procedure and juris-
dictional framework of U.S. antitrust law. Moreover, it urges recogni-
tion of the dependence of the United States on international cooperation
for the attainment of many of its antitrust goals.
1. Basic Characteristics of System
The depth and breadth of the impact of internationalization require
reevaluation of the basic characteristics of the U.S. antitrust law system.
That system has operated in a competitive context that is being funda-
mentally altered by the internationalization of competition. Conse-
quently, the system must be examined to determine whether it continues
to achieve the goals for which it was instituted.
The central characteristics of any system of legal constraints are de-
30. See, e.g., Gerber, supra note 28, at 775.
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termined by the configurations of authority, power and initiative within
it. In particular, the respective roles of the legislature, the courts and the
executive shape the way the system functions. 3' In the United States,
antitrust law is developed primarily by the courts, with the legislature
playing a decidedly minor role. The Sherman Act, the basic antitrust
statute, is exceptionally general, providing little specific guidance for
courts. 32 Moreover, it is more than a century old, and it has been but
little modified. At times the executive (including administrative agen-
cies) has a significaht impact on antitrust enforcement, affects percep-
tions of the law, and influences the courts,33 but the courts remain the
central institutions of United States antitrust law.
The increasing internationalization of competition calls into ques-
tion the dominant position of the courts and thus the basic characteris-
tics of the system. Analysis of the goals of antitrust and of the measures
needed to achieve those goals may, for example, suggest that the legisla-
ture should play a greater role in the antitrust system. Congress alone is
in a position to implement comprehensive and fundamental changes in
the United States antitrust system, and without a significant probability
of such changes, thorough analysis of the impact of internationalization
of competition is unlikely. Moreover, Congress may be in a better posi-
tion to make the types of political judgments and international com-
promises that will be required by the internationalization process.
2. The Efficacy of Substantive Legal Concepts
The substantive concepts of the antitrust laws-both individually
and in relation to one another-must be scrutinized to determine their
appropriateness for attaining antitrust objectives in an increasingly inter-
national context. Such a review may reveal, for example, that the current
concepts of market definition and market power are ineffective and
should be revised or replaced. It may indicate on the other hand that
concepts of economic power should play an even greater role in U.S:
antitrust law than they play today.
34
31. At times, and especially during the last decade and a half, the legal academy has also played
an important role in the development of antitrust law.
32. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976) (original version at ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat.
209 (1890)). See generally 1 E. KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 239 (1980).
33. See generally Baxter, Separation of Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the "Common
Law" Nature ofAntitrust Law, 60 TEX. L. REV. 661, 673-82 (1982); Litvack, Government Antitrust
Policy: Theory Versus Practice and the Role of the Antitrust Division, 60 TEx. L. REV. 649 (1982);
Sullivan, The Antitrust Division as a Regulatory Agency: An Enforcement Policy in Transition, 64
WASH. U.L.Q. 977 (1986).
34. For a discussion of the role of economic power in European antitrust laws, see Gerber, Law
and the Abuse of Economic Power in Europe, 62 TUL. L. REV. 57 (1987).
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3. The Procedures of Antitrust Law
Because the effectiveness of the antitrust system may be influenced
as much by the procedures through which norms are sought to be en-
forced as by the content of the norms themselves, the methods of apply-
ing and enforcing U.S. antitrust law must be a central object of review.
U.S. reliance on private causes of action for enforcement of the antitrust
laws-the private attorney general concept-may, for example, be found
inappropriate in the international context. It is used only occasionally in
other competition law systems, and the costs and uncertainties of litiga-
tion against foreign firms may significantly reduce its effectiveness.
Moreover, its lack of amenability to political control may impede U.S.
attempts to achieve international cooperation in enforcing antitrust
principles.
4. Jurisdictional Issues
Given its impact on the enforcement of U.S. antitrust law, the inter-
nationalization of competition demands assessment of current jurisdic-
tional doctrines. Although the ability of the U.S. independently to
combat the enforcement problem is limited by international law as well
as by political considerations, U.S. jurisdictional principles should be ex-
amined to reduce inequalities in treatment between foreign firms in com-
petition here with U.S. firms to evade U.S. regulation of that competitive
process. Doctrines such as comity that limit the application of antitrust
laws where foreign conduct is involved may require reshaping in light of
the internationalization process. Similarly, constitutional principles re-
lating to personal jurisdiction may need to be reexamined.
The enforcement problems associated with internationalization also
emphasize the ineffectiveness of the current international jurisdictional
system. As I have described in more detail elsewhere,3 5 that system has
become ineffective because it looks solely to the relationship between the
prescribing state and the conduct. It thus fails to provide effective ac-
commodation of the interests of states attempting to regulate their mar-
ketplaces with the interests of states that might be affected by the
prescribing state's exercise of jurisdiction.
5. International Cooperation
Increasing internationalization of competition combined with juris-
dictional limits on the capacities of individual states to achieve their reg-
35. See Gerber, supra note 25, at 198-202.
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ulatory goals by themselves means that the U.S. will become increasingly
dependent on foreign cooperation to accomplish its economic regulatory
objectives. Evaluation of the U.S. antitrust law system therefore must
recognize this dependence. Moreover, effective response to the impact of
internationalizing competition requires analysis of the opportunities for
cooperation as well as the feasibility, benefits and costs of such
cooperation.
The potential role of international cooperation must be evaluated in
all major areas of analysis, including substantive, informational and en-
forcement issues. An effective means of reducing avoidance of national
regulations is agreement among states to include specific substantive
principles in their respective legal systems. Although there are signifi-
cant differences among antitrust law systems, and the scope and breadth
of such agreements are likely to remain limited, some problems such as
the potential harm from international cartelization are widely recog-
nized, and agreement on substantive principles to combat such carteliza-
tion may be attainable among discrete groups of states. Regional
integration as is occurring in the European Economic Communities may
facilitate such cooperation.
Agreements among states to cooperate in the exchange of informa-
tion relative to possible antitrust violations would reduce the ability of
foreign firms to avoid the application of U.S. laws on grounds of lack of
access to necessary information. In order to achieve cooperation in this
area, however, procedural differences between the United States and
much of the rest of the world would have to be reduced because such
differences currently cause significant resistance to cooperation. 36 Again,
cooperation here is likely to be limited to small groups of relatively ho-
mogeneous states. The United States and Canada have, for example,
agreed to exchange information of this type.
37
Cooperation in the enforcement of competition laws is likely to be
particularly difficult to achieve. States generally resist enforcing regula-
tory norms of other states, and the economic and political pressures that
accompany economic regulation are likely to increase this resistance.
Nevertheless, jurisdictions with similar economic regulatory systems may
be willing to agree to mutual assistance to reduce at least egregious eva-
sion of these laws.
36. For discussion of these differences, see generally Gerber, supra note 28.
37. See Agreement Relating to Cooperation on Antitrust Matters, June 29, 1982, United States
of America-Australia, T.I.A.S. No. 10365 (also published at 21 I.L.M. 702 (1982)).
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V. THE ROLE OF COMPARATIVE LAW
Comparative legal analysis is indispensable for effective assessment
of the impact of internationalization and of potential responses to it. The
internationalization of competition is a global phenomenon; all states
confront the same economic processes. Since antitrust laws everywhere
are designed to protect competitive processes by influencing the charac-
teristics of economic conduct, the nature of economic relationships and
the structure of markets, the basic functional objectives of competition
law as well as the factual developments confronting those regulatory
objectives are everywhere much the same.
The value of shared information concerning both the impact of in-
ternationalization and the effectiveness of respon ses to it is therefore
likely to be high. Although there are many differences among competi-
tion law systems, comparative analysis of common issues such as the defi-
nition of markets promises significant benefits.
Moreover, adequate assessment of the potential for international co-
operation and achievement of such cooperation is unthinkable without
such comparative insights. Only where the differences between systems
are fully understood can cooperation be achieved and, more importantly,
be effective.
VI. OBJECTIVES OF THE SYMPOSIUM
This symposium issue of the Chicago-Kent Law Review is intended
as a contribution to this much-needed analysis of the effects of the inter-
nationalization of competition on antitrust law. We have sought to pro-
vide here insights into the general issues as well as analysis of several
specific issues.
We have been guided by the conviction that effective analysis of the
internationalization process and of appropriate responses to it requires
the use of perspectives that can generate insight into the many facets of
the phenomenon. Thus we have sought diverse perspectives on the prob-
lem, including, e.g., those of doctrinal, historical, economic and compar-
ative analysis.
Accordingly, we have also chosen contributors to the Symposium on
the basis not only of their excellence as thinkers, but also of the variety of
their analytical perspectives. We have sought to win as contributors cre-
ative and perceptive analysts of the predicament of antitrust law, and,
fortunately, we have been exceptionally successful in doing so.
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VII. CONTENTS OF THE SYMPOSIUM
In order to achieve depth of analysis sufficient to yield the desired
levels of insight, we have focused on one central aspect of the internation-
alization process and its effects on antitrust law. We realize that the
price of this selectivity is the necessity of omitting many extremely im-
portant issues such as jurisdiction or touching on them only in passing.
The Symposium's central concern is the assessment by one antitrust
law system of the impact of foreign firms and foreign conduct on compe-
tition within its territory. Three of the four principal articles are con-
cerned primarily with the measurement of economic power, particularly
the problem of market definiiion, while the fourth article analyzes trans-
national predation.
The contributions have varying objectives. They include an expla-
nation and analysis of current thinking; a critical challenge to the core of
current thinking; an analysis of the way the problem is analyzed in Ger-
many, where national competition law is perhaps the most sophisticated
outside the U.S.; and an economist's demonstration of the potential val-
ues of economic theory in antitrust analysis.
A. The Internationalization of Competition and
the Definition of Markets
The issue of market definition is critical to the assessment of eco-
nomic power under U.S. antitrust law, and that assessment is central to
antitrust analysis not only in monopolization and merger contexts, but
increasingly even in claims under Section One of the Sherman Act. The
internationalization of competition directly and significantly affects this
issue, and thus the first three articles in the symposium center on this
conceptual mechanism.
The first article, by George Hay, John Hilke and Philip Nelson,38
examines the role of market definition in United States antitrust law and
the special problems involved in defining markets where there is signifi-
cant foreign competition. It discusses the recent evolution of market def-
inition concepts in the context of international competition and analyzes
some of the more important scholarly responses to the effect of interna-
tionalization of markets on the market definition issue.
Richard Markovits' contribution 39 has a fundamentally different ob-
38. Hay, Hilke & Nelson, Geographic Market Definition in an International Context, 64 Cm.-
KENT L. REv. 711 (1988) (Messrs. Hay, Hilke and Nelson's article appears in this symposium
issue).
39. Markovits, International Competition, Market Definition. and the Appropriate Way to Ana-
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jective. It challenges the entire concept of market definition as an analyt-
ical tool for assessing the competitive impact of conduct, and in so doing
it challenges much of the structure of antitrust doctrine. Focusing on
mergers, particularly horizontal mergers, Markovits criticizes current
legal thinking as flawed and ineffective. He argues that the concept of
market-definition is chimeric and misleading because the market-aggre-
gated data on which it rests are intrinsically weak as predictors of the
anticompetitive effect of mergers and, by implication, of other conduct.
The internationalization of markets plays an important role in this argu-
ment because Markovits concludes that the weaknesses of the conven-
tional approach are particularly pronounced-and, therefore, harmful-
where there is international competition. Thus the internationalization
of markets emphasizes the need to change the framework of analysis.
Professor Markovits does not, however, stop at criticism of the cur-
rent situation. He proposes a fundamentally different analysis of the
power of firms to achieve anticompetitive effects. 4° He argues that anti-
trust analysis should focus on relationships among suppliers and poten-
tial suppliers as well as on relationships between those two groups and
particular categories of purchasers. Such an analysis of disaggregated
data, he claims, is not only more effective as a predictor of anticompeti-
tive impact, but likely' to be more amenable to efficient and inexpensive
use in the legal process. Moreover, he believes that this type of analysis
is more effective than traditional analysis in evaluating the impact of for-
eign competition.
B. Power, Jurisdiction and Market Definition: German
and European Contexts
Dr. Kurt Markert, director of the German Federal Cartel Office and
a central figure in European competition law, provides comparative per-
spectives on internationalization and competition laws, in general, and
on the issue of market definition, in particular. 41 He analyzes the role of
market definition in the competition law of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many and assesses the effects of internationalization on the relationship
between European Economic Community law and the national law of the
Federal Republic.
lyze the Legality of Horizontal Mergers Under the Clayton Act: A Positive Analysis and Critique of
both the Traditional Market-Oriented Approach and the Justice Department's Horizontal Merger
Guidelines, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 745 (1988) (Professor Markovits' article appears in this sympo-
sium issue).
40. Id. at 768-72.
41. Markert, German Antitrust Law and the Internationalization of Markets, 64 CHI.-KENT L.
REv. 897 (1988) (Dr. Markert's article appears in this symposium issue).
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Dr. Markert's article focuses on merger law, the area in which the
internationalization process has most seriously affected European compe-
tition law systems. He describes the methods which are used to define
markets under German law, the problems that have been encountered in
applying these methods, and the conceptual and procedural responses
that have been made to the increasing internationalization of competi-
tion. He shows how the real problem of market definition, particularly in
an increasingly international competitive context, is economic power,
and he describes the ways in which German legal thought has responded
to this problem by using a pragmatic definition of markets and a flexible
analysis of economic power.
C. Law, Economics and the Evaluation of International Predation
The final article, by Kenneth Elzinga, a professor of economics,
42
considers the relationship between economic analysis and antitrust law
in the context of international predation. Using as an example the recent
case of Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. ,'4 which
involved alleged transnational predation by Japanese television manufac-
turers, Elzinga describes the problems of analyzing and evaluating al-
leged international predation within the framework of the United States
procedural system. He analyzes the interaction of economic and legal
reasoning in the Matsushita case and offers insights into the potential
roles of economic analysis in applying United States law to foreign-based
conduct.
VIII. ANTITRUST LAW AND COMPETITION: A NEW RELATIONSHIP?
The process of internationalizing competition is not new. Even if we
limit our view to the two centuries or so since the beginning of the indus-
trial revolution, we can identify international elements that increasingly
have influenced economic competition throughout this period. Never-
theless, increases in the extent and complexity of the internationalization
process since the end of the Second World War have been unprece-
dented, and their impact on the capacity of states to regulate their mar-
ketplaces and on the effects of such regulation is only beginning to be a
42. Elzinga, The New International Economics Applied: Japanese Televisions and U.S. Consum-
ers, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 941 (1988) (Professor Elzinga's article appears in this symposium issue).
43. 494 F. Supp. 1161 (E.D. Pa. 1980), aff'd in part, rev'd and remanded in part, sub noa. In re
Japanese Elec. Prod. Litig., 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986), aff'd on remand sub ?oa. In re Japa-
nese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 807 F.2d 44 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied sum nom. Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 401 U.S. 1029 (1987).
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subject of serious study. Although specific issues relating to internation-
alization have been studied, what is critically important is an improved
understanding of the process of internationalization in which these spe-
cific elements are imbedded.
The internationalization of competition represents a fundamental
challenge to United States antitrust law. The function of antitrust law is
to regulate the process of economic competition, and the new competitive
context created by internationalization calls into question not only the
substance and procedure of antitrust law, but also its justifications.
I would like to thank each of the contributors for participating in
this venture and for providing us with highly valuable material. I would
further like to thank the staff of the Chicago-Kent Law Review, particu-
larly Editor-in-Chief Steve Wood, for effectively and judiciously perform-
ing the editorial and publishing tasks connected with publication of this
symposium issue. I hope and believe that our efforts will become part of
a serious and thorough evaluative process which could well have an im-
portant effect on the course of economic activity in the future. The regu-
latory responses of the industrialized states to the process of
internationalization will surely have a significant impact on shaping that
process.
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